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Abstract
I estimate the short-run dynamic effect of ﬁscal shocks on real wages for a panel of euro
area countries. The main ﬁndings are in line with the Neo-Keynesian predictions that real
wages increase in response to spending shocks. However, the scale of the wage response
depends on the type of government spending.
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This paper studies the dynamic effects of positive shocks to different measures of government
spending on real wages using a panel of euro area members.
The literature studying the short-run dynamic effect of government spending shocks shows
that the response of real wages varies across theoretical paradigms and empirical approaches.
Neoclassical models predict that shocks to government spending reduce real wages through
negative wealth effects that induce agents to increase their labour supply. By contrast, Neo-
Keynesian models allowing for price rigidities or other reasons for counter cyclical markups
show that real wages increase in response to these shocks (Linnemann and Schabert 2003; Gal´ ı
et al. 2007; Monacelli and Perotti 2007; Rotemberg and Woodford 1992; Ravn et al. 2007).
Using a wide range of parametrisations, Pappa (2005) compares the dynamic effects of ﬁscal
shocks between these two theoretical frameworks. She ﬁnds that shocks to government con-
sumption and investment produce dissimilar effects. Real wage falls in Neoclassical models
but increase in Neo-Keynesian models.
Accordingly, the response of the real wage is a key differentiating factor between these
theoretical paradigms.
Empirically, the effects of government expenditure shocks are studied with vector autore-
gressions that use different identiﬁcation techniques. For the United States, applications of the
‘narrative’ approach developed by Romer and Romer (1989) show that real wages fall in re-
sponse to military spending shocks (Ramey and Shapiro 1998; Edelberg et al. 1999; Burnside
et al. 2004). However, Perotti (2007) shows that after removing the two implicit restrictions of
this identiﬁcation method (that all Ramey-Shapiro episodes have the same dynamics and that
ﬁscal policy explains all the deviation from ‘normal’ of all endogenous variables), real wages
increase.
Results coming from the structural identiﬁcation approach are typically in line with the
implications of Neo-Keynesian models. Fat´ as and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Perotti (2004, 2007) show that government spending shocks increase real wages. How-
ever, when these models are estimated using quarterly data, ﬁscal shocks may not be fully
unanticipated. When this is the case and the econometric model does not account for it, the
estimated responses may miss the initial (maybe negative) change in wages that is produced
by the expectation of a future increase in government spending.1
Most of the empirical literature studying the dynamic response of real wages focus on four
countries with reliable non-interpolated quarterly data (United States, Australia, Canada and
the United Kingdom).
This paper departs from this literature along two dimensions: (1) it estimates the dynamic
1In order to test if the positive wage responses produced by VARs with quarterly data are the result of antici-
pation effects not being considered, Ramey (2008) estimates a structural VAR for the United States with long run
annual data extended back to 1889. She ﬁnds that responses to government spending shocks are consistent with
Neoclassical models. However, Perotti (2007) estimates a structural VAR using ofﬁcial BEA data and ﬁnds that the
responses of private consumption and real wages become positive. He claims that the qualitative differences in the
wage responses are the result of government spending being interpolated linearly over long intervals prior to 1929.
2response of real wages using a panel of euro area countries and annual data; (2) it compares
the dynamic effect of shocks to different measures of government spending.
In line with the empirical evidence for other advanced countries, I ﬁnd that positive innova-
tions in most measures of government spending increase real wages. Shocks producing these
effects are: government investment, government consumption, these two types taken together
(government absorption) and non-wage government consumption.
I also analyze the effects of shocks to government absorption and consumption in a panel
formed by the four countries earlier mentioned and ﬁnd that real wage responses depend on
its price deﬂator. By contrast, shocks to government investment have no effect on real wages
in these countries.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the strategy to iden-
tify exogenous spending shocks. In Section 3, I describe the data and study the responses to
shocks in different types of government spending. In Section 4, I check the robustness of these
results. Section 5 studies the effect of shocks in government spending in a panel formed by
the four countries used in the studies of Perotti. In Section 6, I analyze the role of alternative
price deﬂators for government spending variables, as well as for wages. Finally, in Section 7, I
conclude.
2 Identiﬁcation Approach
Following Beetsma et al. (2008) and B´ en´ etrix and Lane (2009), I identify ﬁscal shocks using a
Choleski ordering. To this end, it is convenient to present the three-variable structural model
in companion form.
A0Zi;t = A(L)Zi;t 1 + CXi;t + "i;t (1)
Zi;t is a vector of endogenous variables containing: the government spending variable (gi;t),
the real GDP (yi;t) and real wages (wi;t). Xi;t is a vector with the country-speciﬁc intercepts (ci),
country-speciﬁc linear trends (ti;t) and year dummies (dt). Subscripts i and t denote the coun-
try and the year. Matrix A0 captures the contemporaneous relations between the endogenous
variables. Matrix A(L), is the matrix polynomial in the lag operator L that captures the rela-
tion between the endogenous variables and their lags. Matrix C contains the coefﬁcients of the
country ﬁxed effects, the country-speciﬁc linear trends and the time ﬁxed effects. The vector













































3Premultiplying (1) by A 1
0 , I obtain the model in reduced-form,
Zi;t = B(L)Zi;t 1 + DXi;t + ui;t; (2)
whereB(L) = A 1
0 A(L), D = A 1
0 C, ui;t = A 1










. Then, to recover "i;t and 
 from the reduced-form, I set yg = wg = wy = 0 in matrix A0:
Imposing these restrictions is equivalent to assume that ﬁscal spending does not react con-
temporaneously to shocks in the real GDP or in real wages and that the real GDP does not
react contemporaneously to shocks in real wages. Therefore, the Choleski ordering to identify
shocks is: government spending, GDP and real wages. This ordering is motivated by the fact
that government spending is planned before the period starts. Moreover, Beetsma et al. (2006)
estimate a panel VAR in public spending (g) and output (y) for seven EU countries with non-
interpolated quarterly ﬁscal data assuming that g does not react to y within a quarter. From
these results they construct an estimate of the response of public spending to output at annual
frequency ﬁnding that it is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
3 Baseline Empirical Model
3.1 Data
The literature studying the effects of ﬁscal shocks has considered a wide range of government
spending measures. For instance, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) study the effects of shocks to
government consumption on GDP, while Monacelli and Perotti (2006) assess the effect of these
on trade balance, real exchange rate, GDP and private consumption. Monacelli and Perotti
(2008) take shocks to non-wage government consumption and study the dynamic response
of the terms of trade and relative price of nontradables. Cavallo (2005, 2007) distinguishes
between government spending on goods and wages to assess the effects of ﬁscal shocks on
U.S. private consumption and current account. Similarly, Giordano et al. (2007) analyze the
effects of these on Italian GDP. Furthermore, shocks to government investment are studied in
Pappa (2005), Perotti (2007b) and Beetsma et al. (2006, 2008).
Papers examining the dynamic effects of government spending typically take one or two
of these measures. Here, as in B´ en´ etrix and Lane (2009), I take a general approach and study
ﬁve types of government spending. These are: government absorption (GEXP), deﬁned as the
sum of government ﬁxed investment (GINV) and total government consumption (GC); these
two measures taken individually and the wage (WGC) and non-wage (NWGC) components of
government consumption.2
The source of these variables is the OECD Economic Outlook No 82, with the exception of
government ﬁxed investment for Greece. For the latter, I use national sources.3 All govern-
2Government spending is composed of government consumption, government investment and transfers (wel-
fare payments and pensions). Since transfers just redistribute payments across citizens, it should not have short run
impact on macroeconomic variables. Therefore, I exclude this component from the analysis that follows.
3I would like to thank George Tavlas for providing these data.
4ment variables are in real terms (log levels) and deﬂated with their own deﬂators. These are
available at the OECD Economic Outlook No 82. The exception is non-wage government con-
sumption. For this variable I use total government consumption prices. I take these deﬂators
for the baseline estimations because I am primarily interested on the effect of changes in the
quantities purchased by the government. However, I later use GDP prices to deﬂate govern-
ment spending variables and compare the effect of shocks in quantities to the effect of shocks
that combine changes in quantities and relative prices.
The time span of the data is 1970 to 2006. Although data coverage is good, I do not in-
clude wage government consumption for Belgium between 1970 and 1975, Germany in 1970
and Portugal between 1970 and 1977. This last country also lacks data for total government
consumption and government ﬁxed investment for the same period, while Germany lacks to-
tal government consumption for 1970.4 The second variable used in the baseline model is gross
domestic product in constant local currency units. The source of this variable is also the OECD
Economic Outlook.
The goal of this paper is to study the effect of shocks to different measures of government
spending on real wages. Following Lane and Perotti (2003), I deﬁne real wages as real compen-
sation per employee. Since I analyze the economy as a whole without distinguishing between
sectors, I use real consumption wages (i.e. CPI-deﬂated real wages). I take this variable, in-
stead of real product wage, because it is relevant for labour supply and real labour income.
The source of real consumption wages is the Annual Macroeconomic Database of the Euro-
pean Commission (AMECO).
3.2 Estimation Approach
To assess the effects of government spending shocks on real wages, I estimate a panel VAR
for each measure of government spending taking annual data for the period 1970 to 2006 and
eleven euro area countries. I exclude Luxembourg since most of the used spending data are not
available for this country.
In order to deal with country-speciﬁc heterogeneity, each panel VAR includes country ﬁxed
effects and country-speciﬁc linear trends. Furthermore, to eliminate cross-country contempo-
raneous residual correlation, I include time ﬁxed effects. The lag length in each model is set
to two according to the Akaike Information Criterion, Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion
and the absence of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, tested with the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Nickell (1981) and Arellano (2003) show that the introduction of lagged regressors in panels
with ﬁxed effects induce serial correlation between the residuals and future values of the re-
gressors. When the time dimension of the panel is ﬁxed and the cross-section dimension tends
to inﬁnity, this correlation produces a bias in the coefﬁcient of the lagged dependent variable.
The panel has eleven countries and annual data for the period 1970 to 2006. This means that, if
present, biases in the coefﬁcients may be small.
4Data from West Germany and Germany is combined by splicing growth rates in 1991.
5Figure 1 shows the impulse-response functions to a 1 percent of GDP shock in each deﬁni-
tion of government spending. To scale the responses, I take the cross-country mean shares of
each of these ﬁve measures of government spending in GDP. In this panel, GEXP, GINV, GC,
WCG and NWGC represent 22, 3.2, 18.8, 11.2 and 7.6 percent of GDP in the period between
1970 and 2006, respectively.
In order to derive the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse-response distribution in
the ﬁgures, I perform Monte Carlo simulations and assume that the parameter distribution is
normal. Therefore, the mean of the impulse response minus/plus one standard deviation cor-
responds to the 16th and 84th percentiles of its distribution, respectively. With this information,
I construct t-tests that show the statistical signiﬁcance of the mean responses.
3.3 Impulse-Response Analysis
3.3.1 Government Absorption
As in most of the literature studying the dynamic effects of government spending on wages,
the effects of a shock to government absorption are in line with the Neo-Keynesian predictions.
A shock of 1 percent of GDP produces positive impact and delayed responses in real wages
and GDP. The impact wage response equals to 0.95 percent and it is statistically signiﬁcant at
a level of 1 percent. As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, the point estimate of the mean
wage response is statistically signiﬁcant until year nine. Between year zero and year six, it is
signiﬁcant at a level of 1 percent. The peak wage response is located in year two with a value
of 1.18 percent.
A shock to this spending variable is also expansionary. Table 2 shows that the impact and
peak GDP responses are equivalent to 0.91 and 1.28 percent, respectively. The latter is located
in year one. The point estimate of the mean GDP response is statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent
levels between years zero and three. This estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 and 10 percent
in years four and ﬁve, respectively.
3.3.2 Government Investment and Government Consumption
Government investment shocks also increase wages. A 1 percent of GDP shock to this variable
generates the largest response. Its impact equals to 1.37 percent while its peak, located in
year two, equals to 1.66 percent. The point estimate of the mean wage response to a shock in
government investment is statistically signiﬁcant along the whole impulse-response horizon.
Between years zero and four it is signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
A shock of the same magnitude to government consumption also increases wages. The
impact response equals to 1.04 percent and the maximum, located in year two, is equivalent to
1.4 percent. In relation to the wage response produced by a shock to government absorption,
government consumption produces a larger increase on impact and in the following ﬁve years.
In contrast to the evidence reported by Perotti (2007) for the four-country sample, govern-
ment investment is more effective than government consumption in boosting the GDP of these
6euro area countries. The response of the latter to a shock in government investment is greater,
not only for the impact but also for the whole impulse-response horizon. GDP responses are
statistically signiﬁcant up to year seven and three for shocks to investment or consumption,
respectively.
3.3.3 Government Consumption: Wage and Non-Wage Elements
The last two shocks produce different effects on real wages. First, an increase in government
wage consumption leads to a reduction in real wages of the whole economy. Although the
point estimate of the impact is insigniﬁcant, the location of the 16th and 84th percentiles sug-
gest that wages respond negatively in the ﬁrst six years. The minimum response to a shock
in government wages is located in year two and it is equivalent to -1.35 percent. This point
estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent. As I discuss next, the reason for this negative
response is that wage government consumption is negatively correlated with the sum of other
spending variables.
A 1 percent of GDP shock to the non-wage component of government consumption pro-
duces an insigniﬁcant negative impact response. In contrast to a shock in wage government
consumption, real wages present a positive peak in years ﬁve and six equivalent to 0.83 per-
cent and signiﬁcant at a level of 5 percent.
TheeffectsoftheseshocksonGDParealsodifferent. Shockstogovernmentwageconsump-
tion produce statistically insigniﬁcant and negative GDP responses, while shocks to non-wage
government consumption produce signiﬁcant and positive responses.
3.4 Variance Decomposition
To study the contribution of structural innovations to the h-step ahead forecast error variance,
I present the variance decomposition of each estimated panel VAR. This is a complementary
exercise to the impulse-response analysis because it shows the relative power of each structural
shock in explaining the forecast error variance of each equation in the system.
Figure 2 presents the proportion of the forecast error variance attributable to a shock in two
of the three endogenous variables in each panel VAR. That is, for the GDP equation, I show the
share of the variance attributable to a shock in government spending and real wages.5 Since
the interest in on the effect of government spending shocks in wages, I focus on this equation.
The forecast error variance attributable to a shock to government absorption is the largest
across all types of spending shocks and ranges between 6.2 and 22 percent. This is in line with
the fact that wage responses to a shock in this variable are signiﬁcant for a longer period and
for higher levels of conﬁdence. This proportion grows as the forecast horizon becomes larger.
5The proportion of forecast error variance attributable to a shock in the lagged dependent variable is the share
which is not explained by shocks in the other two endogenous variables. For instance, if the proportion of forecast
error variance in the wage equation attributable to shocks in government consumption and GDP are 15 and 35
percent respectively, the proportion attributable to a shock in wages would be 50 percent.
7A shock of 1 percent of GDP to government investment explains on average 6.3 percent of
the whole forecast error variance in the wage equation. This proportion grows at a lower rate
as the forecast horizon becomes larger. The proportion of forecast error variance in the wage
equation attributable to shocks in this variable ranges between 4.3 and 7.9 percent.
When the shock is to government consumption, the proportion attributable to it grows as
the forecast horizon becomes larger. The minimum is 3.4 while the maximum 20.6 percent.
In contrast, wage government consumption shocks explain a smaller proportion. After year
ﬁve it stabilizes around 4.4 percent. Finally, non-wage government consumption explains the
smallest proportion of forecast error variance in the wage equation. The average proportion
attributable to this shock is 1.4 percent.
3.5 Summary
Shocks of the same magnitude to different measures of government spending produce dissim-
ilar responses in real wages and GDP. These depend on how they affect labor productivity and
aggregate demand. For instance, government investment shocks are more likely to increase
labor productivity leading to a rise in real wages. This paper shows that the increase in real
wages is largest when spending shocks are in this variable. Government spending innovations
can have demand side effects. For this panel of countries, shocks to government absorption
and consumption increase real wages. Moreover, non-wage government consumption does
too but with some delay. By contrast, shocks to wage government consumption produce neg-
ative wage responses in the baseline model. However, as I will show next, this qualitative
response is not robust to changes in the VAR speciﬁcation.
GDPresponsesvaryacrossspendingmeasures. Thelargerisproducedbyshockstogovern-
ment investment. Shocks to government absorption, consumption and non-wage government
consumption are also expansionary while shocks to wage government consumption are not.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Four-Variable Panel VAR
The ﬁrst robustness check is to estimate each panel VAR including a new expenditure variable.
This is deﬁned as the difference between government absorption and the ﬁscal variable being
considered. I call this the ‘ﬁscal complement’. The aim of this check is to ensure that the
spending shock being studied is not a shock to a different government spending measure that
is contemporaneously correlated with the former.
To identify shocks I use two Choleski orderings. I place the ﬁscal complement in the ﬁrst
position and the shocked spending variable in the second position, with GDP and wages in
the third and fourth positions respectively. Doing this, I allow the studied government spend-
ing variable to react contemporaneously to shocks in the ﬁscal complement. I report these
responses in Figure 3. Then, I revert the order of the ﬁscal variables.
8The wage and GDP responses obtained with these two alternative orderings are reported
in columns ‘4-vbles VAR 2nd’ and ‘4-vbles VAR 1st’ of Tables 1 and 2. Columns ‘4-vbles VAR
2nd’ show the responses for the case in which the shocked spending variable is ordered in the
second position.
Most of the baseline results are robust to this change in the model speciﬁcation. However,
when the shock is to wage government consumption, the inclusion of the ﬁscal complement
generates qualitative changes in the GDP and wage responses. When wage government con-
sumption is placed in the second position, GDP changes to positive and the wage response be-
comes statistically zero. This qualitative change is the result of wage government consumption
being negatively correlated to the ﬁscal complement. This could be the result of governments
reducing the expenditure in consumption and investment in order to increase the number of
public employees. By contrast, when the identiﬁcation order of the ﬁscal variables is reverted
(the shocked spending variables is ordered ﬁrst), GDP and wage responses are similar to the
baseline.
4.2 Different Time Period
The next robustness check is motivated by the evidence of Perotti (2004) and Romer and Romer
(2007) that the variance of ﬁscal policy shocks and GDP has decreased after approximately the
year 1980. Taking this into account, I estimate the baseline model using data for the period 1980
to 2006.
Tables 1 and 2 show the responses of wage and GDP for each shock. Baseline responses
are qualitatively robust to this change in the data span. A shock to government absorption
produces smaller wage and GDP responses and less signiﬁcant wage responses. A similar
result is observed for shocks to government consumption.
In the same way, shocks to government investment produce smaller mean wage responses
with statistical signiﬁcance falling drastically. GDP responses are also smaller and less sig-
niﬁcant. Shocks to wage government consumption produce less negative and less signiﬁcant
wage responses as well as less persistent GDP contraction. Finally, the responses of wages to
shocks in non-wage government consumption are greater and more signiﬁcant from year three
onwards. Mean GDP responses, however, become smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Another robustness check aims at capturing the European Monetary Union (EMU) effect.
Tables 1 and 2 show the responses of all endogenous variables for the period between 1970 and
1998.
Shocks to government absorption produce impact and year-one wage responses that are
greater but less persistent. The signiﬁcance of the wage response falls for pre-EMU data. Simi-
larly, impact and year-one GDP responses are greater. A shock to government investment gen-
erates larger impact wage responses and a reduction in the degree of persistence and statistical
signiﬁcance. The response of GDP is also greater on impact and year-one and less persistent
than the baseline.
Government consumption leads to larger wage responses in the ﬁrst years but less per-
9sistence and signiﬁcant. The same pattern is found on the GDP response. Wage government
consumption produces less negative wage responses with no change in the signiﬁcance while
non-wage government consumption produces larger wage responses for the impact and sub-
sequent ﬁve years. For a shock in the latter, the GDP response is greater in the ﬁrst years and it
is less persistent.
These two experiments give mutually consistent results. For the period preceding the cre-
ation of the EMU, wage and GDP responses tend to be stronger and more signiﬁcant than in
the period going from 1980 to 2006. These is consistent with the ﬁndings of Perotti (2004) and
Romer and Romer (2007). Accordingly, the baseline model produces responses which are, in
most of the cases, between these two.
4.3 Debt Feedback
Following Beetsma et al. (2008), I check if the baseline results are robust to the inclusion of
the general government consolidated gross debt as a ratio of GDP. To this end, I include the
logarithm of the ﬁrst two lags of this variable. The source of these data is the AMECO database.
As shown in Table 1, the debt feedback produces no signiﬁcant changes in the response of
real wages to a shock in government absorption, either in its level or in its signiﬁcance. For the
GDP, however, Table 2 shows that responses are slightly greater in this speciﬁcation.
A shock to government investment produces slightly larger wage and GDP responses.
Shocks to government consumption produce larger wage and GDP responses in the ﬁrst years.
Finally shocks to wage government consumption produce less negative wage responses, while
shocks to non-wage government consumption give smaller wage responses. For the latter, the
GDP response is slightly smaller for latter years and less statistically signiﬁcant.
4.4 Summary
Thissectionshowsthatmostofthebaselineresultssurviveallrobustnesschecks. Theexception
is wage government consumption. Shocks to this variable produce negative wage responses in
the baseline that disappear when the model speciﬁcation is changed to account for correlations
with the ﬁscal complement.
5 The Perotti Sample
Most ofthe papers studyingthe dynamic effectsof government spendingon wages takea small
set of countries or, as in many cases, focus on the United States economy.
Pappa (2005) studies the effects of shocks to government consumption, investment and
employment on the real wages of the United States using annual data. She deﬁne real wages
as the average wage per job deﬂated with the aggregate price deﬂator. Using sign constraints
which are robust to Neoclassical and Neo-Keynesian theoretical predictions to identify ﬁscal
shocks she ﬁnds positive real wage and employment responses.
10Taking Canada, United Kingdom and United States, Perotti (2007) ﬁnds that shocks to gov-
ernment expenditure in goods and services, increase real product wage (nominal wage deﬂated
with GDP prices) in the whole economy and, more importantly, in the manufacturing sector.
In that study, government expenditure includes purchases of military equipment and excludes
ﬁxed capital formation. Data is in quarterly frequency and ﬁscal shocks are identiﬁed following
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004).
As in Monacelli and Perotti (2006) and Perotti (2007), this paper takes the set of countries for
which reliable non-interpolated quarterly ﬁscal data are available (Australia, Canada, United
Kingdom and United States). I call this set ‘the Perotti sample’. By contrast, rather than study-
ing different VARs for each country separately using quarterly data and identifying shocks
with their method, I estimate a panel VAR with annual and identify shocks as in Section 2.
Similarly to the EMU panel, I take the real consumption wage (nominal wage deﬂated with
consumption prices).
Figure 4 shows the real wage responses to shocks in government absorption, government
investment and government consumption. The wage and non-wage components of the latter
are not studied since these data are not available for Australia at the OECD Economic Outlook.
This ﬁgure shows that all these shocks are expansionary. However, the point estimates of
the real wage are statistically insigniﬁcant. The inspection of the conﬁdence bands shows that
wage tends to respond negatively after year two and four to shocks in government absorption
and government consumption, respectively. This result is in sharp contrast to the results for
the EMU countries.
Moreover, while a shock in government investment produces the largest real wage response
in the euro countries, the same shock have no effect in the Perotti sample. These contrasting re-
sults are in line with the ﬁndings of B´ en´ etrix and Lane (2009) that real exchange rate responses
are the opposite for the EMU and this panel. Moreover, the fall in real consumption wages
seems to be in contrast to the ﬁndings of Perotti (2007) that real product wage increase in re-
sponse to government consumption shocks. However, as I will show next, the price deﬂator
used to construct real wages plays a crucial role.
6 Alternative Price Deﬂators
6.1 Government Spending Deﬂated with GDP Prices
The preceding part of the paper was concentrated on the effects of shocks in the quantities pur-
chased by governments. That is, real spending variables were constructed using each speciﬁc
government price deﬂator. This approach is also implemented by Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006)
and Beetsma et al. (2008). A different strategy is to deﬂate ﬁscal variables with GDP prices
(Lane and Perotti 2003, Pappa 2005, Perotti 2004, 2007 or Monacelli and Perotti 2006).
This section make a step in this direction. More precisely, I estimate the baseline model
using GDP deﬂated government spending data. Doing this, ﬁscal shocks combine changes in
government quantities and relative prices.
11Tables 3 and 4 show the wage and GDP responses to these shocks. As in the baseline, I
check their robustness using the same tests of Section 4.
An inspection of these shows that the wage responses to ﬁscal shocks that include changes
in quantities and relative prices are larger than the baseline and qualitative the same for many
measures of government spending (government absorption, consumption and non-wage gov-
ernment consumption). By contrast, the effect of shocks to government investment’s relative
prices and quantities is smaller and less signiﬁcant than the effect of shocks to investment
quantities alone.
The main change produced by adopting the GDP deﬂator is on the wage response to shocks
in wage government consumption. A 1 percent of GDP shock to wage government consump-
tion produces the largest wage response across all types of government spending. This shock
increases real wages by 3.42 percent on impact with a peak of 3.95 percent in year one. How-
ever, a caveat against the use of the GDP deﬂator in this case is the fact that, if government
nominal wages are endogenous to private-sector nominal wages, shocks in the former would
not be completely exogenous. Therefore, the use of the GDP deﬂator may be problematic.
I also estimate the real wage responses for the Perotti sample using GDP-deﬂated govern-
ment spending variables. For these countries, there are not large qualitative differences in the
shape of the wage responses to shocks in government absorption or government consump-
tion. By contrast, government investment produces negative real wage responses. Quantita-
tively, GDP-deﬂated government absorption and consumption produce larger positive impact
responses that change to negative after year two. As in the previous case, the point estimates
of the mean real wage responses are statistically insigniﬁcant.
6.2 CPI- versus GDP-Deﬂated Real Wages
Thissectioncomparesthedynamiceffectsofgovernmentspendingshocksonrealconsumption
and real product wages. The difference between these is that the former can be thought as real
wages perceived by private agents, since it is deﬁned as nominal compensation per employee
deﬂated with private consumption prices. By contrast, the latter is nominal compensation per
employee deﬂated with GDP prices. Hence it is a measure of ﬁrm costs (real wages paid to the
employees).
Table 1 shows the point estimates of the mean responses of real product wage to shocks
in the government spending variables for the EMU sample.6 A 1 percent of GDP shock in
government absorption produces responses in real consumption wage which are larger than
those of the real product wage for the impact as well as for year one and two. Similarly, shocks
to government investment produce larger consumption wage responses in the ﬁrst years. This
difference is greater than the one produced by government absorption.
Government consumption shocks produce larger increases in the real product wage. In con-
trast to the previous cases, this difference persists for the whole impulse-response horizon. As
6For completeness, Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the real wage and GDP responses for the case in which real product
wage is used.
12in the government consumption case, responses to shocks in wage and non-wage government
consumption are smaller for real consumption wages.
In contrast to the case of the EMU, the responses of the real product and real consump-
tion wages differ in the Perotti sample. This is the case of shocks to government absorption
or government consumption. However, responses to shocks in government investment are
qualitatively the same (shocks to this variable do not affect real wages).
Since the point estimates of these responses are statistically insigniﬁcant, I analyze the qual-
itative differences by plotting the conﬁdence bands. Figure 5, shows that shocks to government
absorption produce positive real product wage and negative real consumption wage responses.
This same pattern is observed in shocks to government consumption.
7 Conclusions
Although the literature is not conclusive on the theoretical effects of government spending
shocks in wages, most empirical studies ﬁnd evidence supporting the Neo-Keynesian predic-
tions. That is, spending shocks produce a GDP expansion and an increase in real wages.
However, this same literature has been mostly concentrated on countries with reliable non-
interpolated quarterly ﬁscal data, leaving unexplored the effects of these policies in other coun-
tries. An exception is the work of Lane and Perotti (2003). This article takes a panel of OECD
countries and ﬁnds that shocks to wage government spending increase the real product wage
in the short run. The authors also ﬁnd that this effect is stronger under a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime.
Here I studied the dynamic effects of positive shocks to different measures of government
spending taking eleven euro area members. More precisely, I estimated a panel VAR using
annual data and conducted impulse-response analysis identifying shocks with a Choleski de-
composition.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that shocks to government absorption, government ﬁxed
investment, government consumption or non-wage government consumption increase real
wages (either CPI- or GDP-deﬂated wages). These results, that survive all robustness checks,
are also observed for the case of government spending shocks that combine changes in quanti-
ties and relative prices, i.e. government spending variables deﬂated with GDP prices.
Finally, the impact of shocks to wage government consumption depends on the deﬂator
employed. In particular, it seems that shocks to the quantity of public employees do not affect
real wages. By contrast, if shocks are to the level of public wage pay, this is associated with
an increase in real wages. However, if government nominal wages are endogenous to private-
sector nominal wages, shocks in the former would not be completely exogenous.
I also analyzed the effects of some of these shocks in a panel formed by the countries used
in the studies of Perotti. As in Perotti (2007), I ﬁnd that shocks in government absorption and
consumption increase real GDP-deﬂated wages. However, these shocks reduce CPI-deﬂated
wages. This result highlights the need of further research on the sources of this difference.
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15Table 1: Real wage responses to ﬁscal spending shock equivalent to 1% of GDP.
shock Baseline 4-vbles VAR 2nd 4-vbles VAR 1st post 1980 pre-EMU DEBT GDP-deﬂated W
0 0.95 *** 0.57 *** 1.10 *** 0.97 *** 0.89 ***
1 1.13 *** 0.69 ** 1.22 *** 1.17 *** 1.07 ***
2 1.18 *** 0.78 ** 1.03 *** 1.22 *** 1.14 ***
3 1.17 *** 0.82 ** 0.80 ** 1.20 *** 1.17 ***
4 1.10 *** 0.81 ** 0.59 * 1.12 *** 1.16 ***
GEXP 5 0.99 *** 0.74 ** 0.41 0.99 *** 1.10 ***
6 0.85 *** 0.64 * 0.26 0.83 *** 1.01 ***
7 0.70 ** 0.51 * 0.14 0.67 ** 0.89 ***
8 0.55 ** 0.38 0.05 0.52 * 0.75 ***
9 0.42 * 0.26 -0.01 0.39 * 0.62 **
10 0.30 0.16 -0.04 0.27 0.50 **
0 1.37 *** 1.20 *** 1.42 *** 0.78 ** 1.44 *** 1.42 *** 1.04 ***
1 1.60 *** 1.37 *** 1.65 *** 0.74 1.51 *** 1.70 *** 1.16 ***
2 1.66 *** 1.38 *** 1.69 *** 0.78 0.94 * 1.78 *** 1.32 ***
3 1.65 *** 1.35 ** 1.67 *** 0.85 0.37 1.75 *** 1.49 ***
4 1.57 *** 1.30 ** 1.59 *** 0.88 0.02 1.65 *** 1.58 ***
GINV 5 1.44 ** 1.22 ** 1.47 ** 0.85 -0.11 1.49 ** 1.58 ***
6 1.27 ** 1.11 * 1.32 ** 0.75 -0.12 1.31 ** 1.50 ***
7 1.09 ** 0.99 * 1.16 ** 0.62 -0.07 1.12 ** 1.37 ***
8 0.92 ** 0.87 * 0.99 ** 0.48 -0.01 0.94 * 1.21 ***
9 0.76 * 0.75 * 0.83 * 0.34 0.03 0.78 * 1.04 ***
10 0.62 * 0.64 * 0.69 * 0.22 0.05 0.64 * 0.88 **
0 1.04 *** 0.86 *** 1.09 *** 0.78 *** 1.26 *** 1.09 *** 1.10 ***
1 1.31 *** 1.09 *** 1.35 *** 1.09 ** 1.51 *** 1.39 *** 1.41 ***
2 1.40 *** 1.15 *** 1.41 *** 1.23 ** 1.41 *** 1.46 *** 1.46 ***
3 1.35 *** 1.10 ** 1.37 *** 1.25 ** 1.19 *** 1.39 *** 1.43 ***
4 1.22 *** 0.98 ** 1.25 *** 1.16 ** 0.93 ** 1.22 *** 1.34 ***
GC 5 1.05 ** 0.82 ** 1.07 ** 1.01 ** 0.68 * 1.01 ** 1.21 ***
6 0.85 ** 0.64 * 0.87 ** 0.83 * 0.45 0.79 * 1.06 ***
7 0.67 * 0.47 0.68 * 0.64 0.28 0.58 0.90 **
8 0.50 * 0.31 0.49 * 0.47 0.14 0.39 0.74 **
9 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.32 0.05 0.23 0.59 **
10 0.23 0.07 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.45 *
0 -0.50 0.59 -0.68 * -0.13 -0.57 -0.45 -0.44
1 -1.22 * 0.38 -1.46 ** -0.84 -1.18 * -1.13 * -0.83
2 -1.35 ** 0.13 -1.59 ** -1.02 -1.26 ** -1.28 * -0.89
3 -1.21 * 0.00 -1.35 ** -0.93 -1.07 * -1.18 * -0.82
4 -0.99 * -0.06 -1.04 * -0.75 -0.84 -1.00 * -0.72
WGC 5 -0.79 -0.09 -0.78 -0.55 -0.67 -0.83 -0.62
6 -0.62 -0.13 -0.60 -0.37 -0.57 -0.69 -0.54
7 -0.51 -0.17 -0.49 -0.22 -0.52 -0.59 -0.47
8 -0.42 -0.20 -0.42 -0.09 -0.50 -0.51 -0.42
9 -0.36 -0.24 -0.38 0.00 -0.48 -0.46 -0.38
10 -0.32 -0.27 -0.36 0.06 -0.45 -0.43 -0.34
0 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.80 *** -0.14 -0.33 -0.03
1 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.53 0.22 -0.21 0.01
2 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.11 0.69 0.17 0.29
3 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.98 ** 0.51 0.58
4 0.75 * 0.83 ** 0.85 ** 1.00 ** 1.04 ** 0.73 * 0.78 **
NWGC 5 0.83 ** 0.89 ** 0.91 ** 1.11 ** 0.94 ** 0.81 * 0.87 **
6 0.83 ** 0.85 ** 0.87 ** 1.07 ** 0.76 ** 0.80 ** 0.88 **
7 0.76 ** 0.74 ** 0.76 ** 0.95 ** 0.56 ** 0.74 ** 0.83 **
8 0.67 ** 0.62 ** 0.63 ** 0.78 ** 0.39 * 0.64 ** 0.75 **
9 0.57 ** 0.50 ** 0.51 ** 0.61 ** 0.26 0.54 * 0.66 **
10 0.48 ** 0.39 * 0.40 * 0.46 * 0.17 0.44 * 0.57 **
Note: Point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. *, ** and ***, denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5
and 1 percent, respectively.
16Table 2: Real GDP responses to ﬁscal spending shock equivalent to 1% of GDP.
shock Baseline 4-vbles VAR 2nd 4-vbles VAR 1st post 1980 pre-EMU DEBT GDP-deﬂated W
0 0.91 *** 0.47 *** 1.11 *** 0.97 *** 0.90 ***
1 1.28 *** 0.76 *** 1.42 *** 1.42 *** 1.25 ***
2 1.23 *** 0.81 *** 1.19 *** 1.36 *** 1.19 ***
3 1.01 *** 0.71 ** 0.81 *** 1.11 *** 0.97 ***
4 0.75 ** 0.55 * 0.47 * 0.82 ** 0.70 **
GEXP 5 0.51 * 0.37 0.21 0.55 0.45
6 0.30 0.21 0.04 0.32 0.23
7 0.13 0.07 -0.06 0.12 0.05
8 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.09
9 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.15 -0.20
10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.24 -0.27
0 1.73 *** 1.61 *** 1.72 *** 1.21 *** 1.94 *** 1.79 *** 1.71 ***
1 2.27 *** 2.08 *** 2.27 *** 1.83 *** 2.43 *** 2.43 *** 2.21 ***
2 2.24 *** 2.13 *** 2.29 *** 1.86 *** 2.02 *** 2.40 *** 2.17 ***
3 2.00 *** 1.98 *** 2.07 *** 1.61 ** 1.42 ** 2.13 *** 1.94 ***
4 1.71 *** 1.75 *** 1.77 *** 1.25 * 0.94 * 1.81 *** 1.65 ***
GINV 5 1.43 ** 1.51 ** 1.46 ** 0.89 0.62 1.51 ** 1.35 **
6 1.17 ** 1.27 ** 1.18 * 0.58 0.43 1.24 * 1.06 *
7 0.94 * 1.05 * 0.92 0.32 0.33 1.00 0.80
8 0.75 0.86 0.70 0.13 0.26 0.81 0.57
9 0.59 0.69 0.52 0.00 0.22 0.65 0.38
10 0.46 0.54 0.37 -0.09 0.18 0.52 0.22
0 0.74 *** 0.41 ** 0.72 *** 0.33 * 1.01 *** 0.79 *** 0.72 ***
1 1.10 *** 0.66 ** 1.07 *** 0.55 * 1.30 *** 1.19 *** 1.07 ***
2 0.97 ** 0.53 * 0.96 ** 0.58 1.04 ** 1.02 ** 0.93 **
3 0.70 * 0.29 0.69 * 0.51 0.68 * 0.69 * 0.64 *
4 0.42 0.05 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.35
GC 5 0.17 -0.16 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.09
6 -0.02 -0.32 -0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.20 -0.12
7 -0.18 -0.44 -0.23 -0.03 -0.12 -0.40 -0.29
8 -0.28 -0.51 -0.34 -0.12 -0.16 -0.55 -0.40
9 -0.35 -0.55 -0.41 -0.18 -0.17 -0.65 -0.48
10 -0.39 -0.56 -0.45 -0.20 -0.16 -0.71 -0.52
0 -0.22 0.66 * -0.47 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.24
1 -0.44 1.02 * -0.75 -0.59 0.03 -0.35 -0.53
2 -0.55 0.81 -0.83 -0.74 -0.17 -0.50 -0.68
3 -0.56 0.50 -0.68 -0.60 -0.33 -0.56 -0.74
4 -0.54 0.25 -0.50 -0.35 -0.43 -0.58 -0.75
WGC 5 -0.50 0.03 -0.40 -0.10 -0.49 -0.58 -0.74
6 -0.48 -0.15 -0.38 0.09 -0.54 -0.58 -0.72
7 -0.46 -0.31 -0.40 0.23 -0.55 -0.57 -0.70
8 -0.44 -0.42 -0.44 0.30 -0.55 -0.57 -0.66
9 -0.43 -0.51 -0.48 0.32 -0.53 -0.56 -0.63
10 -0.41 -0.56 -0.51 0.32 -0.49 -0.55 -0.59
0 0.51 ** 0.45 ** 0.48 ** -0.08 0.71 ** 0.49 ** 0.44 **
1 0.87 ** 0.79 ** 0.82 ** 0.08 1.03 ** 0.88 ** 0.75 **
2 1.02 ** 0.97 ** 1.00 ** 0.34 1.06 ** 1.02 ** 0.91 **
3 1.06 ** 0.98 ** 1.01 ** 0.56 0.94 ** 1.05 ** 0.95 **
4 1.01 ** 0.89 ** 0.92 ** 0.67 0.74 * 1.00 ** 0.91 **
NWGC 5 0.92 ** 0.76 * 0.79 * 0.67 0.53 0.90 * 0.81 **
6 0.80 * 0.63 * 0.64 * 0.58 0.33 0.77 * 0.69 *
7 0.67 * 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.18 0.64 0.55
8 0.55 0.39 0.39 0.29 0.07 0.52 0.42
9 0.44 0.30 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.41 0.30
10 0.35 0.23 0.23 0.05 -0.03 0.31 0.20
Note: Point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. *, ** and ***, denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5
and 1 percent, respectively.
17Table 3: Real wage responses to ﬁscal spending (GDP-deﬂated) shock equivalent to 1% of GDP.
shock Baseline 4-vbles VAR 2nd 4-vbles VAR 1st post 1980 pre-EMU DEBT GDP-deﬂated W
0 1.17 *** 0.95 *** 1.32 *** 1.23 *** 1.30 ***
1 1.34 *** 0.94 *** 1.38 *** 1.41 *** 1.38 ***
2 1.31 *** 0.90 *** 1.11 *** 1.37 *** 1.27 ***
3 1.22 *** 0.89 *** 0.82 *** 1.26 *** 1.16 ***
4 1.10 *** 0.86 *** 0.58 ** 1.12 *** 1.06 ***
GEXP 5 0.95 *** 0.78 *** 0.38 * 0.95 *** 0.95 ***
6 0.79 *** 0.66 ** 0.23 0.78 *** 0.83 ***
7 0.63 ** 0.54 ** 0.11 0.62 ** 0.70 ***
8 0.49 ** 0.41 ** 0.03 0.48 ** 0.58 ***
9 0.37 ** 0.29 * -0.02 0.36 * 0.46 **
10 0.27 * 0.20 -0.04 0.27 0.36 **
0 1.17 *** 0.15 1.12 *** 0.53 1.28 *** 1.23 *** 1.16 ***
1 1.24 *** -0.08 1.11 ** 0.22 1.26 ** 1.37 *** 1.07 **
2 1.20 ** -0.35 0.87 * 0.12 0.66 1.35 ** 1.02 **
3 1.15 ** -0.36 0.76 0.18 0.16 1.29 ** 1.06 **
4 1.08 * -0.15 0.77 0.26 -0.07 1.20 ** 1.10 **
GINV 5 0.99 * 0.14 0.84 * 0.31 -0.08 1.10 * 1.10 **
6 0.89 * 0.41 0.90 * 0.31 0.02 0.99 * 1.05 **
7 0.79 * 0.60 0.93 ** 0.28 0.12 0.87 * 0.97 **
8 0.69 * 0.72 * 0.91 ** 0.23 0.19 0.76 0.87 **
9 0.59 * 0.77 ** 0.86 ** 0.17 0.22 0.66 0.76 **
10 0.50 0.77 ** 0.79 ** 0.11 0.21 0.57 0.65 *
0 1.55 *** 1.66 *** 1.68 *** 1.30 *** 1.75 *** 1.61 *** 1.72 ***
1 1.85 *** 2.06 *** 2.03 *** 1.40 *** 1.86 *** 1.92 *** 1.91 ***
2 1.87 *** 2.11 *** 2.04 *** 1.50 *** 1.59 *** 1.93 *** 1.81 ***
3 1.74 *** 1.93 *** 1.86 *** 1.54 *** 1.23 *** 1.77 *** 1.64 ***
4 1.51 *** 1.60 *** 1.57 *** 1.47 *** 0.85 *** 1.52 *** 1.43 ***
GC 5 1.24 *** 1.22 *** 1.25 *** 1.29 *** 0.53 ** 1.24 *** 1.22 ***
6 0.97 *** 0.87 *** 0.95 *** 1.05 *** 0.28 0.96 *** 1.01 ***
7 0.73 ** 0.58 ** 0.69 *** 0.81 *** 0.11 0.72 ** 0.81 ***
8 0.53 ** 0.35 * 0.49 ** 0.58 ** 0.01 0.51 * 0.63 **
9 0.37 * 0.18 0.33 * 0.39 * -0.04 0.35 0.48 **
10 0.25 0.05 0.20 0.23 -0.07 0.22 0.34 *
0 3.42 *** 3.50 *** 3.51 *** 3.53 *** 3.57 *** 3.54 *** 3.47 ***
1 3.93 *** 4.03 *** 4.03 *** 3.64 *** 3.57 *** 4.08 *** 3.98 ***
2 3.50 *** 3.50 *** 3.62 *** 3.05 *** 2.55 *** 3.62 *** 3.53 ***
3 2.81 *** 2.67 *** 2.94 *** 2.40 *** 1.51 *** 2.88 *** 2.88 ***
4 2.13 *** 1.88 *** 2.26 *** 1.83 *** 0.74 2.14 *** 2.25 ***
WGC 5 1.54 *** 1.23 ** 1.65 *** 1.34 ** 0.23 1.49 *** 1.72 ***
6 1.07 ** 0.74 1.15 ** 0.93 * -0.07 0.96 * 1.28 **
7 0.70 0.38 0.76 * 0.60 -0.23 0.55 0.92 **
8 0.42 0.14 0.47 0.35 -0.29 0.24 0.63 *
9 0.21 -0.04 0.24 0.17 -0.29 0.02 0.41
10 0.06 -0.16 0.08 0.04 -0.27 -0.15 0.23
0 0.50 ** -0.03 0.50 ** -0.06 0.73 ** 0.52 ** 0.80 ***
1 0.72 ** 0.13 0.72 * 0.15 1.01 ** 0.75 ** 0.86 **
2 1.01 ** 0.51 1.03 ** 0.76 * 1.24 *** 1.03 ** 1.03 ***
3 1.21 *** 0.85 ** 1.29 *** 1.29 *** 1.29 *** 1.22 *** 1.17 ***
4 1.26 *** 1.02 ** 1.37 *** 1.53 *** 1.17 *** 1.26 *** 1.21 ***
NWGC 5 1.21 *** 1.02 *** 1.31 *** 1.53 *** 0.95 *** 1.20 *** 1.18 ***
6 1.08 *** 0.92 *** 1.15 *** 1.36 *** 0.71 ** 1.07 *** 1.08 ***
7 0.93 *** 0.77 ** 0.95 *** 1.12 *** 0.50 * 0.91 ** 0.95 ***
8 0.77 ** 0.62 ** 0.75 ** 0.87 *** 0.34 * 0.75 ** 0.82 ***
9 0.63 ** 0.48 * 0.58 ** 0.64 ** 0.22 0.60 ** 0.69 ***
10 0.51 ** 0.37 * 0.45 * 0.45 * 0.14 0.48 ** 0.57 **
Note: Point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. *, ** and ***, denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5
and 1 percent, respectively.
18Table 4: Real GDP responses to ﬁscal spending (GDP-deﬂated) shock equivalent to 1% of GDP.
shock Baseline 4-vbles VAR 2nd 4-vbles VAR 1st post 1980 pre-EMU DEBT GDP-deﬂated W
0 0.73 *** 0.44 *** 0.86 *** 0.79 *** 0.71 ***
1 0.97 *** 0.50 ** 1.06 *** 1.07 *** 0.91 ***
2 0.92 *** 0.45 * 0.84 *** 1.01 *** 0.84 ***
3 0.76 *** 0.38 0.53 ** 0.82 *** 0.65 ***
4 0.57 ** 0.30 0.26 0.61 ** 0.46 **
GEXP 5 0.40 0.21 0.07 0.42 0.28
6 0.24 0.13 -0.04 0.25 0.12
7 0.12 0.05 -0.10 0.12 0.00
8 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.10
9 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.17
10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.22
0 1.94 *** 1.80 *** 1.90 *** 1.38 *** 2.27 *** 2.03 *** 1.91 ***
1 2.51 *** 2.29 *** 2.46 *** 1.84 *** 2.78 *** 2.71 *** 2.41 ***
2 2.43 *** 2.20 *** 2.36 *** 1.78 *** 2.34 *** 2.62 *** 2.29 ***
3 2.16 *** 2.01 *** 2.09 *** 1.52 ** 1.72 *** 2.32 *** 2.00 ***
4 1.85 *** 1.85 *** 1.82 *** 1.19 * 1.22 ** 1.99 *** 1.68 ***
GINV 5 1.57 *** 1.71 *** 1.58 ** 0.89 0.88 1.70 ** 1.38 **
6 1.32 ** 1.59 ** 1.37 ** 0.62 0.68 1.44 ** 1.10 *
7 1.11 * 1.45 ** 1.18 ** 0.41 0.54 1.22 * 0.87
8 0.93 * 1.30 ** 1.00 * 0.24 0.44 1.03 0.66
9 0.77 1.14 ** 0.83 0.12 0.36 0.88 0.49
10 0.64 0.99 * 0.69 0.03 0.28 0.75 0.35
0 0.56 *** 0.20 0.54 *** 0.28 ** 0.68 *** 0.60 *** 0.52 ***
1 0.78 *** 0.34 0.77 *** 0.22 0.84 *** 0.83 *** 0.71 ***
2 0.73 *** 0.31 0.73 ** 0.21 0.63 ** 0.75 *** 0.62 **
3 0.57 ** 0.17 0.56 * 0.23 0.33 0.55 * 0.44 *
4 0.38 -0.01 0.34 0.22 0.09 0.33 0.23
GC 5 0.20 -0.19 0.14 0.17 -0.08 0.13 0.05
6 0.04 -0.33 -0.03 0.10 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10
7 -0.07 -0.43 -0.15 0.01 -0.19 -0.17 -0.22
8 -0.15 -0.48 * -0.23 -0.06 -0.19 -0.27 -0.30
9 -0.21 -0.50 * -0.28 -0.12 -0.16 -0.33 -0.35
10 -0.24 -0.50 * -0.30 -0.15 -0.13 -0.37 -0.38
0 0.76 *** 0.28 0.75 *** 0.76 *** 0.80 ** 0.86 *** 0.75 ***
1 0.90 ** 0.23 0.89 ** 0.62 * 0.82 ** 0.99 ** 0.87 **
2 0.61 -0.12 0.59 0.26 0.32 0.65 0.53
3 0.19 -0.53 0.16 -0.07 -0.21 0.17 0.05
4 -0.19 -0.87 * -0.23 -0.31 -0.57 -0.29 -0.39
WGC 5 -0.49 -1.10 ** -0.53 -0.45 -0.73 -0.65 -0.72
6 -0.69 -1.23 ** -0.74 -0.53 -0.75 -0.91 -0.95 *
7 -0.82 -1.27 ** -0.87 * -0.54 -0.69 -1.07 * -1.08 *
8 -0.88 * -1.26 ** -0.93 * -0.52 -0.57 -1.16 * -1.14 **
9 -0.89 * -1.21 ** -0.94 * -0.47 -0.45 -1.19 * -1.15 **
10 -0.87 * -1.13 ** -0.92 * -0.41 -0.33 -1.18 * -1.11 **
0 0.54 ** 0.23 0.54 ** 0.00 0.77 ** 0.58 *** 0.50 **
1 0.88 *** 0.49 * 0.89 *** 0.04 1.06 *** 0.94 *** 0.79 **
2 1.03 *** 0.71 ** 1.06 *** 0.27 1.01 ** 1.07 *** 0.92 **
3 1.04 *** 0.80 ** 1.06 *** 0.52 0.83 ** 1.06 *** 0.93 **
4 0.97 ** 0.78 ** 0.95 ** 0.66 * 0.60 0.97 ** 0.86 **
NWGC 5 0.84 ** 0.69 * 0.79 ** 0.66 0.39 0.84 ** 0.73 *
6 0.70 * 0.58 * 0.62 * 0.56 0.21 0.69 * 0.58
7 0.56 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.09 0.55 0.43
8 0.44 0.36 0.33 0.25 0.01 0.42 0.29
9 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.10 -0.03 0.31 0.17
10 0.24 0.22 0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 0.08
Note: Point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. *, ** and ***, denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5
and 1 percent, respectively.





























































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real wages (w).
20Figure 2: Variance decomposition.






























































































































































Note: Each row represents a VAR model for each deﬁnition of government spending. Vertical axis
measures the percentage of forecast error variance attributable to a shock in the plotted endogenous
variable.














































































































































shock in WGC shock NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real wages (w).
22Figure 4: Responses to a spending shock equivalent to 1% of GDP using the Perotti sample:




























































































Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real wages (w).
23Figure 5: Comparison between CPI- and GDP- deﬂated wage responses to a spending shock














































Note: 16th and 84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis
indicates the percentage change in CPI-deﬂated and GDP-deﬂated real wages.
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